TUM EGO EN INQUAM. — Prosa 3
Thanne seide I, "Now am I confowndide by a more hard doute
than I was."
"What doute is that?" quod sche, "for certes I
conjecte now by whiche thingis thou art trubled."
"It semeth," quod I, "to repugnen and to
contrarien gretly, that God knoweth byforn alle thinges and that
ther is any fredom of liberte. For yif so be that God loketh alle
thinges byforn, ne God ne mai nat ben desceyved in no manere,
thanne moot it nedes ben that alle thinges betyden the whiche
that the purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn to comen. For whiche,
yif that God knoweth byforn nat oonly the werkes of men, but also
hir conseilles and hir willes, thanne ne schal ther be no liberte
of arbitrie; ne certes ther ne may be noon othir dede, ne no wil,
but thilke whiche that the devyne purveaunce, that ne mai nat ben
disseyved, hath felid byforn. For yif that thei myghten writhen
awey in othere manere than thei ben purveyed, thanne ne sholde
ther be no stedefast prescience of thing to comen, but rather an
uncerteyn opynioun; the whiche thing to trowen of God, I deme it
felonye and unleveful.
"Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun (as who seith, I
ne allowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke same resoun) by whiche
that som men wenen that thei mowe assoilen and unknytten the
knotte of this questioun. For certes thei seyn that thing nis nat
to comen for that the purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn that it
is to comen, but rathir the contrarie; and that is this: that,
for that the thing is to comen, that therfore ne mai it nat ben
hidd fro the purveaunce of God; and in this manere this necessite
slideth ayein into the contrarie partie: ne it ne byhoveth nat
nedes that thinges betiden that ben ipurveied, but it byhoveth
nedes that thinges that ben to comen ben ipurveied — but as
it
were Y travailed (as who seith, that
thilke answere
procedith ryght as though men travaileden or weren besy) to
enqueren the whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing, as
whethir the prescience is cause of the necessite of thinges to
comen, or elles that the necessite of thinges to comen is cause
of the purveaunce. But I ne enforce me nat now to schewen it,
that the bytidynge of thingis iwyst byforn is necessarie, how so
or in what manere that the ordre of causes hath itself; although
that it ne seme naught that the prescience bringe in necessite
of bytydinge to thinges to comen.
"For certes yif that any wyght sitteth, it byhoveth by
necessite that the opynioun be soth of hym that conjecteth that
he sitteth; and ayeinward also is it of the contrarie: yif the
opinioun be soth of any wyght for that he sitteth, it byhoveth
by necessite that he sitte. Thanne is here necessite in the toon
and in the tothir; for in the toon is necessite of syttynge, and
certes in the tothir is necessite of soth. But therfore ne
sitteth nat a wyght for that the opynioun of the sittynge is
soth, but the opinioun is rather soth for that a wyght sitteth
byforn. And thus, althoughe that the cause of the soth cometh of
that other side (as who seith, that
althoughe the
cause of soth cometh of the sittynge, and nat of the trewe
opinioun),
algatis yit is ther comune necessite
in that oon and in that othir. Thus scheweth it that Y may make
semblable skiles of the purveaunce of God and of thingis to
comen. For althoughe that for that thingis ben to comen therfore
ben thei purveied, and nat certes for thei be purveied therfore
ne bytide thei nat; yit natheles byhoveth it by necessite that
eyther the thinges to comen ben ipurveied of God, or elles that
the thinges that ben ipurveyed of God betyden. And this thing
oonly suffiseth inow to destroien the fredom of oure arbitre
(that is to seyn, of our fre wil).
"But certes now schewith it wel how fer fro the sothe
and
how up-so-doun is this thing that we seyn, that the betydynge of
temporel thingis is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to
wenen that God purveieth the thinges to comen for thei ben to
comen — what oothir thing is it but for to wene that thilke
thinges that bytidden whilom ben cause of thilke soverein
purveaunce that is in God? And herto I adde yit this thing: that
ryght as whanne that I woot that a thing is, it byhoveth by
necessite that thilke selve thing be; and eek whan I have knowen
that any thing schal betyden; so byhovith it by necessite that
thilke same thing betide; so folweth it thanne that the betydynge
of the thing iwyste byforn ne may nat ben eschued. And at the
laste, yif that any wyght wene a thing to ben oothir weyes than
it is, it nis nat oonly unscience, but it is desceyvable opynioun
ful divers and fer fro the sothe of science. Wherfore, yif any
thing be so to comen that the betidynge of it ne be nat certein
ne necessarie, who mai witen byforn that thilke thing is to
comen? For ryght as science ne may nat ben medled with falsnesse
(as who seith, that yif I woot a thing,
it ne mai
nat ben fals that I ne woot it), ryght so thilke thing that
is conceyved by science ne may nat ben noon other weies than as
it is conceyved. For that is the cause why that science wanteth
lesynge (as who seith, why that wytynge
ne
resceyveth nat lesynge of that it woot); for it byhoveth by
necessite that every thing he ryght as science comprehendeth it
to be.
"What schal I thanne seyn? In whiche manere knoweth God
byforn the thinges to comen, yif thei ne ben nat certein? For yif
that he deme that thei ben to comen uneschewably, and so may be
that it is possible that thei ne schollen nat comen, God is
disseyved. But not oonly to trowe that God is disseyved, but for
to speke it with mouthe, it is a felonous synne. But yif that God
woot that ryght so as thinges ben to comen, so schollen they
comen, so that he wite egaly (as who
seith,
indifferently) that thingis mowen ben doon or elles nat
idoon, what is thilke prescience that ne comprehendeth no certein
thing ne stable? Or elles what difference is ther bytwixe the
prescience and thilke japeworthi devynynge of Tyresie the
divynour, that seide, 'Al that I seie,' quod
he, 'either it schal be or elles it ne schal nat
be?' Or elles how mochel is worth the devyne prescience
more than the opinioun of mankynde, yif so be that it demeth the
thinges uncertayn, as men doon, of the whiche domes of men the
betydinge nis nat certein? But yif so be that noon uncertein
thing ne mai ben in hym that is right certeyn welle of alle
thingis, than is the betydinge certein of thilke thingis whiche
he hath wist byforn fermely to comen. For whiche it folweth that
the fredom of the conseiles and of the werkis of mankynde nis
noon, syn that the thought of God, that seeth alle thinges
withouten errour of falsnesse, byndeth and constreyneth hem to
[o] bytidynge by necessite.
"And yif this thing be oonys igrauntid and resceyved
(that is to seyn, that ther nis no fre
wil), thanne
scheweth it wel how gret destruccioun and how gret damages ther
folwen of thingis of mankynde. For in idel ben ther thanne
purposed and byhyght medes to good folk, and peynes to badde
folk, syn that no moevynge of fre corage [and] voluntarie ne hath
nat disservid hem (that is to seyn,
neither mede ne
peyne). And it scholde seme thanne that thilke thing is
alther-worst whiche that is now demed for alther-moost just and
moost ryghtful, that is to seyn that schrewes ben punysschid or
elles that good folk ben igerdoned, the whiche folk syn that hir
propre wil ne sent hem nat to the toon ne to that othir
(that is to seyn, neither to good ne to harm), but
constreyneth hem certein necessite of thingis to comen. Thanne
ne schulle ther nevere be, ne nevere were, vice ne vertu, but it
scholde rather ben confusion of alle dissertes medlid withouten
discrecioun. And yit ther folweth anothir inconvenient, of the
whiche ther ne mai be thought no more felonous ne more wikke, and
that is this: that, so as the ordre of thingis is iled and cometh
of the purveaunce of God, ne that nothing is leveful to the
conseiles of mankynde (as who seith that men han no power to don
nothing ne wilne nothing), thanne folweth it that oure vices ben
referrid to the makere of alle good (as
who seith,
thanne folweth it that God oughte han the blame of our
vices), syn he constreyneth us by necessite to doon vices.
"Than nis ther no resoun to han hope in God, ne for to
preien to God. For what scholde any wyght hopen to God, or why
scholde he preien to God, syn that the ordenance of destyne
whiche that mai nat ben enclyned knytteth and streyneth alle
thingis that men mai desiren? Thanne scholde ther be don awey
thilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen God and men (that is to seyn, to
hopen and to preien). But by the pris of ryghtwisnesse and of
verray mekenesse we disserven the gerdon of the devyne grace
whiche that is inestimable (that is to seyn, that it is so greet
that it ne mai nat ben ful ipreysed). And this is oonly the
manere (that is to seyn, hope and preieris) for whiche it semeth
that men mowen spekyn with God, and by resoun of supplicacion be
conjoyned to thilke cleernesse that nis nat aprochid no rather
or that men byseken it and impetren it. And yif men ne wene nat
that hope ne preieris ne han no strengthis by the necessite of
thingis to comen iresceyved, what thing is ther thanne by whiche
we mowen ben conjoyned and clyven to thilke sovereyne prince of
thingis? For whiche it byhoveth by necessite that the lynage of
mankynde, as thou songe a litil herebyforn, be departed and
unjoyned from his welle, and failen of his bygynnynge (that is
to seyn, God).
